Navya-nyaya is a modern school of Indian logic, which was established by Gangesopadhyaya in the thirteenth centuny, and it has developed a method of unique expression in determining terms. Take for example the concept of 'invariable concomitance' (vyapti), in a proposition like 'where there is A (smoke), there is B (fire)', the Pracina-Naiyayikas or traditional logicians could define it only in a passive manner like 'avinabhava' or and they did not hit upon any idea as to how to express a term denoting indefinite entity or 'unknown quantity', to say nothing of the way of expressing it by symbols. Though there exists an indication by yat tat in Sanskrit, the interpretation as such is liable to lead to ambiguity and misunderstanding if many terms are taken into consideration at one time.
Even Navya-naiyayikas did not find a satisfactory solution of this problem, and they devised some kinds of expression for that. But if any particular entity be substituted for A, B is expressed, though in an indirect procedure, through the property (dharma) and relation (sambandha) derived from A, and consequently a way is open to more analytical and subtle scrutiny about the above question. In case any term be determined, its qualifyer or characteristic difference is given. Though smoke can be determined by its essential property i.e. dhumatva inherent in the smoke, such expression does not bring out much positive meaning. They put a primary emphasis on the conditional state of two entites, placing them in such a correlative relation (nirupya-nirupaka-sambandha) as cause-effect relation etc. Accordingly, when smoke and fire happen to be a cause and its effect respectively, the smoke has cause-ness (hetuta) and the fire effect-ness (sadhyata); these relational abstracts can be inherent in whatever happens to be hetu or -335- one is property and the other is relation. Hence the smoke in question comes to be related to the fire as its effect in the following way: (dhuma-) nistha-dhumatva-avacchinna-samyoga-avacchinna-hetuta-nirupita-sadhyata, and sadhyata-vat is regarded equipollent to the fire in question, which is, in turn, characterised by 'vahnitva-avacchinna-samyoga-avacchinnasadhyata-vat'. These three factors, abiding in the same entity viz. smoke or fire, play the most important role in determining terms in Navya-nyaya.
In such a way as above-mentioned, they made every possible attempt to reduce all the descriptive and verbal phrases to relation-and propertyfactors, which are, in a sense, substitute signs and do not bear any longer verbal significance but symbolic one.
As regards the one unique characteristic of Navya-naiyayikas' argument, they first set forth a definition of a certain term, then examine it from every aspect, and finally make it complete by adding exhaustive supple.
mentary-explanations: thus the first defintion becomes extraordinarily enlarged in its Sanskrit structure with the addition of terrifying technical terms, and very often the first fresh interpretation turns out far-fetched and hair-splitting. This process is technically called 'pariskara'. It is indeed such avacchedaka and avacchinna that frighten the students of Indian logic, and the. Naiyayikas were bent on the task of analysing and specifying the concept of each term, making the interpretation more and more unintelligible. There even exists a special treatise dealing with these limitingfactors.
-334-
The Determination of Terms in Navya-Nyaya (A. Uno) Relation (sambandha) is possible between relative entities , and as such exists in each sambandhin. Take for instance a proposition 'ghato bhutale bhavati' (a pot is on the ground), samyoga relation abides both in the pot and in the ground, and moreover this samyoga has two aspects i.e. pratiyogita and anuyogita; by anuyogita the samyoga is connected to the ground, and by pratiyogita it is in the pot. Suppose we see the samyoga relation (R) between A (adhikarana e.g. the ground) and Ba (adheya e.g. a pot), in which relation R stands to A and to B? Next how other relations R' and R", which are obtained by R-A, and R-B respectively, are connected to A or R and to B or R? It seems that they took much pains in explaining these questions, and they even devised, some idea which traditional logicians had never hit upon. R-A (how R is related to A. The following formulae should be understood in the similar way.) by anuyogita; R-B by pratiyogita; R'-R by pratiyogita.
(some say svarupa); R'-A by svarupasambandha; R"-R by pratiyogita (some say svarupa); R"-B by anuyogita.
In connection with these definitions of Naiyayikas, Sankara attacks severely in his Bhasya, rejecting all kinds of relation except tadatmya, because they fall the prey of anavastha dosa or ad infinitum.
Avacchedakadharma discriminates any avacchinna from vijatiya ag well as from sajatiya, and, in this sense, it might well be termed 'limitor'
and avacchinna (the limited) is always limited or determined by its avacchedaka. We can see a common usage of avacchedaka as below:
(1) ghatatva-avacchinna-ghatah/ Avacchedaka is here used as a property or essense, and it refers to all pots in general and not to a particular.
(2) ghatatva-avacchinna-pratiyogitaka-ghatah/ Avacchedaka is required here to refer to a specific pratiyogitft abiding in pots in general, as well as to exclude other pratiyogita in pata etc.
(3) (rakta-) ghata-nistha-pratiyogitaka-ghatah/ -333-
The Determination of Terms in Navya-Nyvya (A. Uno) (64) Pratiyogita here is excluded, from those of the homogeneous (sajatiya) and of the heterogeneous (vijatiya e.g. blue-pot). Here the avacchedaka is either redness, potness or something else, as usually expressed by 'etadvyaktitva'.
The ghata of (2) and (3) is related to its pratiyogita contingently, in contradiction to the fact that the avacchedaka (ghatatva) of the case (1) Such is the common usage of limiting-factors which we usually come across in the fundamental treatises of Navya-nyaya.
As a clue to the better understanding of the logical process, which caused the Naiyayikas to invent such technics of expression, we want here to take up the definition of abhava (non-existence) in relation to its counterpositive or pratiyogi. In avacchedaka resides avacchedakata which is considered as a case of svarupasambandha, and all instances of avacchedakata may be brought under either visayata or pratiyogita. In such case, there might occur doubts whether the locus involves ghatabhava only, or patabhava etc. too, and whether the abhava is the negation of a particular pot or of pots in general. It is impossible to think of either the collection of all pots at a place, or the complete samanya-ghata-abhava when even one particular pot exists there. Thus the presence of even one particular hampers the non-existence of pots in general. When such abhava as excludes the existence and non-existence of any particular is taken into account, there comes an expression like 'ghatatva-avacchinna-pratiyogitaka-
The Determination of Terms in Navya-Nyvya (A. Uno) abhava'. However, even with this expression, the locus has a possibility of implying another abhava e.g. patabhava etc. And furthermore there is another difficulty, that is, when one particular pot exists on the ground, its existence can be negated by means of joint property i.e. ghatatva (potness) plus patatva (clothness) together. In order to avoid such difficulties, pratiyogita residing in the pot should be determined neither by other avacchedakas than ghatatva e.g. patatva etc. nor by the joint dharma e.g. ghatapatobhayatva, henceforth we can define the ghatabhava as
It is the same with the case of relational determination. In a proposition like 'atra bhutale ghatah samyogena' (a pot is on the ground by the contact relation), the pot is negated there by the joint relation of samyoga and samavaya as much as by the samavaya. Therefore pratiyogita of ghatabhava should be 'samyogasamavayobhayasambandhanavacchinna' as well as determined as follows: ghatatva-avacchinna-(ghatatvetara-anavacchinna)-sarnyogasambandha-avacchinna-(sariayogetara-sambandha-anavacchinna)-pratiyogitaka-abhava. Though the portions in the parentheses are usually omitted, they are understood as above by means of 'laksana' or implication.
The simplification of the technical terms of Navya-nyaya has been undertaken by some scholars like Dr. Ingalls by resorting to the idea of modern western logic especially symbolic logic, though the success is limited only to a few terms. It seems that there is some scope for interpretation of Navya-nyaya on that line, but still there is some limit which the criticism of one system by the other cannot transcend. One is a new trend buttressed by modern scientific investigation, reducing all the terms to pure relations, while the other, in its structure composed of property and relation, is based exclusively on the traditional metaphysics of Nyaya and Vaisesika. Though it is utterly necessitated, in its final study, to trace the same method that was once employed by the Navyanaiyayikas, yet it is none the less important to shed brighter light on this system by some scientific approach or other.
